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CHARTING A NEW COURSE
The Knox-Pye-King Board and Naval Professional Education, 
1919–23
David Kohnen
David Kohnen is director of the John B. Hattendorf 
Center for Maritime Historical Research at the Na-
val War College. He received his PhD at King’s Col-
lege London. Among his published works, Kohnen 
is the editor of 21st Century Knox: Influence, Sea 
Power, and History for the Modern Era (Naval In-
stitute Press, 2016). Previously, Kohnen focused on 
the transatlantic alliance between the British Em-
pire and the United States in Commanders Winn 
and Knowles: Winning the U-boat War with Intel-
ligence (Enigma, 1999). An upcoming book for the 
Naval Institute Press will be Two Kings and a Navy: 
The U�S� Navy of Admiral Ernest J� King and the 
Fifty Years War for Command at Sea, 1901–1946�
Naval War College Review, Summer 2018, Vol. 71, No. 3
 Education occurs in many forms within the context of military organizations, whether during peace or war� Training often reflects the prevailing doctrines, 
as prescribed within the hierarchical context of rank-oriented organizations� The 
nexus between education and training remains an uncharted area of historical 
interest among contemporary military thinkers� As we look beyond the present 
to the unexplored frontier of the future, the past may offer some perspective on 
the question of professional military education�
Given these broad assertions, this article focuses on the problem of educa-
tion within the U�S� Navy of the First World War era� In considering the efforts 
of Captains Dudley W� Knox and Ernest J� King of a century ago, contemporary 
practitioners may recognize familiar trends concerning the future of professional 
military education� Throughout their careers of 
more than fifty years, Knox and King challenged 
fellow American naval professionals to open 
their minds in addressing the strategic problem 
of education� With Commander William S� Pye 
contributing, Knox and King studied the problem 
in detail on their return from Europe after the First 
World War�
Knox and King presided in compiling their 
recommendations, while Pye gathered evidence 
to substantiate their conclusions concerning the 
problem of education within the Navy� Knox, King, 
and Pye characterized U�S� naval professionals, 
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particularly at the higher levels of command, as having been fundamentally 
unequipped, from an educational perspective, to perform within the context 
of the First World War� Broadly, USN officers suffered from ignorance after 
being educated by the Naval Academy “only in preparation for the lowest com-
missioned grade�”1 In making this provocative assertion, Knox and King drew 
inspiration from their personal interactions with a variety of ranking officers� In 
particular, King and Knox recalled the “salt horse” culture that had prevailed in 
their First World War dealings with such figures as Royal Navy (RN) admiral Sir 
David Beatty and USN admirals Henry B� Wilson and Hugh Rodman� Reputa-
tions centered on questions of seamanship and years of practical experience; 
King railed against this in his characterizations of Beatty and with his observa-
tion that “Wilson, like Rodman and some other senior officers, distrusted ‘book 
learning�’”2 Acting on their assertions, Knox and King collaborated with Pye to 
stage an educational revolution from within the middle ranks of the Navy after 
the First World War�
Admirals Henry T� Mayo and William S� Sims provided inspiration and bu-
reaucratic “top cover” for their protégés Knox and King� In keeping with the 
tribal culture that defined the American naval service at that time, the individu-
als in question all maintained strong professional connections with each other� 
Transcending their initial Naval Academy education, they adopted the prevail-
ing Navy-wide culture that viewed the service more as a fraternal society than a 
lifelong vocation�3 During the first fifty years of the twentieth century, American 
naval officers demonstrated such commitment that Henry L� Stimson character-
ized them as being almost religious about their profession� Having served in a 
number of presidential administrations (twice as Secretary of War and once as 
Secretary of State), Stimson grew to respect the “peculiar psychology of the Navy 
Department, which frequently retired from the realm of logic into a dim religious 
world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States 
Navy the only true church�”4
JUST BELOW THE SURFACE OF NAVAL HISTORY
The problem of education and its underlying strategic importance to the U�S� 
Navy was reflected in efforts to define the naval profession� The unresolved fight 
over professional education in the Navy of the nineteenth century also defined 
the early twentieth-century perspectives of Knox, Pye, and King�5 To place their 
perspectives into a historical context: Navies traditionally had required person-
nel with technical expertise in the sciences, rather than the humanities, for the 
practical purposes of operating and maintaining ships� Drawing from the ideas of 
British historians such as Sir John Knox Laughton and Spenser Wilkinson, Rear 
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Admiral Stephen B� Luce, USN, stirred debate after he established the Naval War 
College in Newport, Rhode Island, in 1884�6 His protégé Captain Alfred Thayer 
Mahan also considered the problem in one of his earliest writings, in 1879� In an 
article entitled “Naval Education,” Mahan challenged the prevailing attitude of 
the Navy Department bureaucracy, arguing that the historical functions of the sea 
services should be considered a national investment�7 He encouraged Americans 
to seize a future economic stake in the international context� To this end, Mahan 
pressed for the development of a strong merchant marine and a credible navy to 
participate in the global maritime arena�8
Historically, navies comprised seagoing practitioners of multiple social back-
grounds and cultural identities� In considering the historical and social dimen-
sions of maritime strategy, Mahan warned the U�S� Navy to avoid overemphasiz-
ing the “necessarily materialistic character of mechanical science,” which “tends 
rather to narrowness and low ideals�”9 He also considered the historical nexus of 
peace and war to be an uncharted area of consistent strategic interest for future 
historical discussion� By comparison with other navies in the global maritime 
arena, the U�S� Navy was among the least remarkable from a technical perspective 
in 1890, when Mahan gained international fame with the publication of his The 
Influence of Sea Power upon History. Mahan acknowledged technologies as a vari-
able, but he encouraged fellow naval professionals to seek a deeper understand-
ing of the maritime arena� “Nevertheless,” Mahan lamented, his fellow American 
naval professionals tended to suffer from a “vague feeling of contempt for the 
past, supposed to be obsolete, [that] combine[d] with natural indolence to blind 
men even to those permanent strategic lessons which lie close to the surface of 
naval history�”10
The culture of the American naval service reflected the scientifically oriented 
curriculum of the U�S� Naval Academy� Naval Academy training conditioned 
midshipmen to follow the rules, adopt a mathematical approach to solving prob-
lems through a “concentration on fractions,” and accept rote doctrinal solutions� 
The Naval Academy engineered the development of practitioners to become tac-
tically minded masters of seamanship� Before the First World War, the formulaic 
approach of the Naval Academy curriculum fueled a counterproductive culture 
within the Navy, beginning when the “average midshipman, reluctant to admit 
his ignorance, would stand at the blackboard chewing chalk rather than ask a 
question�”11 On graduation, junior practitioners sought to earn reputations for 
competence by offering scientifically framed empirical answers in their interac-
tions with the more seasoned, seagoing salt horses among the senior ranks of the 
Navy�12 Junior officers refuted their senior-ranking counterparts at their peril, 
which tended to stratify further the ranks of the Navy�
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Thus, the Naval Academy indoctrinated graduates to take a mathematical ap-
proach to solving abstract problems, and the hierarchical system of bureaucracy 
and ranking by lineal seniority governed the culture of the service; however, these 
tendencies only somewhat overshadowed the underlying nuances and informal-
ity that operated among individual personalities� These group dynamics among 
associated individuals that characterized the underlying culture of the service 
also influenced the development of professional education in the Navy� William 
S� Sims served as one nexus for such informal but important associations�
Having spent thirteen years in Canada in his youth, Sims returned to the Unit-
ed States shortly after the Civil War� In his youth he constantly sought adventure, 
avoided working for grades in school, and assumed the nickname “Bloody Bill�”13 
He considered pursuing a career as an artist� But as the U�S� Navy went through 
a technological transformation from the era of wooden ships and sail to that of 
steel and steam, Sims also found inspiration in the progressive vision of the Navy, 
which provided opportunities to operate on the cutting edge of technology, and 
he successfully sought an appointment to the Naval Academy� He performed 
well as a student but poorly as a midshipman, earning a reputation for collecting 
demerits� Sims proudly remembered running afoul of one instructor: Lieutenant 
Commander Alfred Thayer Mahan� Standing watch on campus, Mahan sternly 
punished Sims for being “disorderly on the quarterdeck and disrespectful to the 
officer of the deck�”14 Sims nearly failed to meet the requirements for graduation 
from the academy, but long before he graduated in 1880 he had earned a reputa-
tion within the ranks�
Sims directly participated in a period of revolutionary changes in both tech-
nology and American strategy� For him, rank held no great significance in the 
pursuit of a shared vision of a U�S� Navy “second to none�”15 Combat experiences 
further solidified the unique connections among individuals that characterized 
the culture of the American sea services� During the 1900 Boxer Rebellion in 
Asiatic waters, Sims became a close mentor to Knox and friendly with King� Be-
yond their shared interests in naval gunnery and battleship design, Sims enjoyed 
discussing esoteric subjects in naval history with Knox and King� Later, as naval 
aide to President Theodore Roosevelt, Sims continued nurturing ties with Knox 
and King� In particular, Sims frequently traveled from Washington to Annapo-
lis, where he called on King while the latter served as an instructor at the Naval 
Academy�
With Sims acting as a common mentor, Knox and King developed a lifelong 
friendship that originated in their shared fascination with maritime history� Both 
served with Lieutenants Harry E� Yarnell and William S� Pye under Rear Admiral 
Hugo W� Osterhaus in the Second Battleship Division of the Atlantic Fleet after 
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1909� Knox and King collaborated with Yarnell and Pye in planning gunnery 
exercises with the Royal Navy during a cruise to European waters in 1910� At 
that time, Commander Sims reported into the Second Battleship Division in 
command of the predreadnought USS Minnesota (BB 22)�
Junior-ranking personnel frequently gained insight into the higher-ranking 
politics of the Navy when they served on fleet staffs� Assignment under Oster-
haus in the Atlantic Fleet provided such a perspective for Knox, King, and Pye� 
Among other matters, they observed higher-ranking officers discussing the 
controversial appointment of Sims to command Minnesota� In 1910, Sims stood 
seventieth on a list of 120 officers in the rank of commander; such an assignment 
usually was reserved for officers of a higher lineal seniority or of lower senior-
ity in the rank of captain�16 Captain William S� Benson warned Sims to tread 
carefully as skipper in Minnesota, as Sims’s connections to Roosevelt clearly had 
influenced his assignment� Benson warned Sims that many naval officers thought 
that the appointment “established a dangerous precedent of giving battleships to 
Commanders�”17 On reporting for duty in Minnesota, Sims met with Osterhaus 
and his relief, Rear Admiral Joseph B� Murdock� As the higher commanders set 
all the details for the forthcoming cruise to European waters, they gossiped; and 
observing from the corners were Knox, King, and Pye�18
Sims nurtured his reputation and carried himself with a cosmopolitan de-
meanor to attain celebrity status within the service� Beyond his close association 
with Roosevelt, Sims had significant political influence through his wife, Anne, 
and his father-in-law, Ethan Allen Hitchcock, the American ambassador to the 
tsarist court of the Russian Empire� In addition, Sims boasted close friendships 
with famous RN personalities, including the First Sea Lord, Sir John A� “Jackie” 
Fisher; Captains Sir Percy M� Scott and Sir John R� Jellicoe also counted Sims 
among their closest friends�19 The American officer anticipated the development 
of a transatlantic relationship between the British Empire and the United States�
In celebrating the unique connection between the two maritime powers dur-
ing a celebratory dinner at the Guildhall in London in December 1910, Sims 
muddled his way into an international controversy� The scope of his remarks went 
beyond official American policy, extending to a prospective Anglo-American 
alliance� The New York Times characterized the Anglo-American celebrations at 
the Guildhall as a “Love Feast�” “Had that speech been made by any other officer 
below the rank of Captain in the Atlantic Fleet, except Sims,” one USN officer 
suggested to the New York Times, “it’s dollars to doughnuts that no attention 
would have been paid to it, but coming from Sims, who despite his rank and 
youth is one of the best-known officers in the service, made it different�”20 For 
his indiscretion, rivals within the service ensured that Sims was removed from 
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command of Minnesota, which resulted in his extended exile away from the fast 
track to higher command—as a student at the Naval War College in 1911.21
Sims recognized the assignment to the College as a punitive setback, which 
likely carried personal consequences in the fierce competition for higher com-
mand among the seagoing ranks of the Navy. But Sims accepted his fate and com-
mitted himself to his studies. He soon recognized the broader value of historical 
studies, informed debates in a classroom setting, and provocative argument in 
written form.
The issue of professional education within the U.S. Navy remained unresolved 
by the time Mahan died in 1914 and Luce in 1917. Sims took up their cause, as the 
future of the Naval War College seemed bleak—particularly under the adminis-
tration of Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels.
“REMAIN CHEERFUL”
Sims’s dashing reputation, coupled with his unique willingness to 
buck the system, automatically inspired great respect from many ju-
nior officers within the ranks. In particular, Knox considered Sims 
to be the “model of an American naval officer.”22 Personal corre-
spondence between Sims and King also reflected a close friendship, 
although King disingenuously recalled in his memoirs that he “was 
never one of the group of Sims’s devoted disciples and followers.”23
As the First World War raged in Europe and Asia, Sims secured 
orders to command the then-named Atlantic Fleet Destroyer and 
Torpedo Boat Flotilla in 1914. In this role, Sims employed Naval War 
College methods to inspire subordinate protégés to carry forward 
the cause of educating other seagoing practitioners of the Navy.
Pulling every bureaucratic string, Sims circumvented the Navy Department’s 
detailing processes to arrange orders for a very select team of junior officers to 
serve under his command in the flotilla. In particular, he pulled Knox from ser-
vice in the tender USS Dixie (AD 1) and King from his assignment as skipper of 
USS Terry (DD 25). In this role, King fell under the immediate operational com-
mand of Commodore Henry T. Mayo during the conduct of convoy-escort duties 
in support of operations against the Mexican insurgency off Veracruz. Sims asked 
King to leave command of Terry, with the enticement of “coming to the flotilla 
to lend us a hand in the schemes we are trying to develop.”24 Sims sweetened the 
proposal by offering King command of USS Cassin (DD 43). With Sims assuming 
the Nelsonian role of senior mentor among equals, Knox and King assumed their 
roles in the flotilla—the “band of brothers.”25
Service in the “Sims flotilla” inspired strategic connections among key per-
sonalities as the U.S. Navy carried out the transformation of its fleet from one 
Captain Dudley W. Knox, USN.
U.S. Navy photograph, courtesy North 
Sturtevant
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dominated by coal-burning battleships to one of oil-powered warships of various 
types and specialized capabilities� Among others on Sims’s flotilla staff, Com-
manders William V� Pratt, Joel R� P� Pringle, and Harry Yarnell helped foster 
close bonds among the individual destroyer skippers, including Lieutenant Com-
manders Harold R� Stark, William F� “Bill” Halsey Jr�, and Joseph K� Taussig�26 In 
their personal correspondence, veterans of the Sims destroyer flotilla tended to 
use the phrase “remain cheerful” as their parting salutation, denoting their mu-
tual membership in a unique fraternity within the ranks of the Navy�27
Sims inspired subordinates to focus on a common vision and work together 
as a team� He issued mandatory reading lists for his skippers to enable them to 
participate in open wardroom discussions, whether on topics in naval history, 
including reconstructions of past battles, or the testing of their current theories 
during tabletop wargames� Sims referred to the atmosphere established among 
the officers in the flotilla as a “War College afloat�”28 Through such open discus-
sions, Sims and his staff developed totally new tactics for maneuvering destroy-
ers in unison, using a wireless communications system of fewer than thirty-one 
words�29 The cost savings resulting from conducting the developmental tests with 
destroyers rather than the larger battleships enabled Sims and his men to pioneer 
new tactics that could be applied to larger 
fleet operations�
In the process, Sims himself transformed 
from being a seagoing salt horse into a zealot 
for the Naval War College brand of profes-
sional education� Such commitment to this 
cause put him out of step with the political 
agenda of Navy Secretary Daniels; Sims’s 
relationship and dealings with Admiral 
William S� Benson as the first Chief of Naval 
Operations also remained tenuous� Given 
the costs involved with maintaining a sepa-
rate Naval War College, Daniels and Benson 
judged the institution’s curriculum to be suf-
ficiently analogous to that of the Army War 
College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania� Given the 
pressures of balancing budgets and political 
horse trading within Congress, Daniels and 
Benson endorsed the idea of a unified Army 
and Navy war college, which could be estab-
lished closer to the capital�30
Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy (left), and Admiral William S. Benson, 
Chief of Naval Operations (right).
Naval History and Heritage Command
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For Sims the idea of closing the Naval War College seemed outrageous, as 
the U�S� Navy stood on the brink of potential involvement in the global conflict 
already raging among the empires of Europe and Asia� He considered the funda-
mental differences between armies and navies so profound that the “Naval War 
College should be made one of the principal assets of the Naval Service�”31 Against 
the overarching emphasis that Daniels and Benson placed on the maintenance 
of seagoing forces, Sims argued for the potential necessity of placing warships 
“out of commission in order to avoid decreasing the efficiency of the education 
of our officers�”32 Sims challenged fellow naval professionals to recognize the 
strategic advantages to be derived from supporting the educational mission of 
the Naval War College� With a clear purpose in mind, Sims articulated his points 
in an article published in the Naval Institute Proceedings in mid-1916 under the 
provocative title “Cheer Up!! There Is No Naval War College�”
In the article, Sims cited complaints from some within the seagoing ranks that 
many of their colleagues needed a “dictionary to tell them the meaning of the 
commonest terms�” Sims chastised critics of the Naval War College, suggesting 
that they suffered from “wholly unpardonable ignorance,” then broadened his 
charge: “When I went to the college � � � the service was very generally ignorant 
of its purposes and the practical value of its teachings�” He deplored the failure 
of many officers to understand “its vital importance to the efficient conduct of 
our fleet�”33
Sims stated that he wished to “make plain that he [was] a thorough and enthu-
siastic advocate of the college�” The article characterized the Naval War College as 
an educational forum wherein practitioners enjoyed freedom of discussion� Sims 
offered the seemingly counterintuitive argument that there was
no War College, as the term “college” is usually understood� There is no president or 
corps of professors who remain during life and good behavior and whose duty it is to 
impose their conclusions upon the pupils� � � � [The] assemblage of officers is practi-
cally a board convened each year for the purpose of determining the best manner of 
conducting naval warfare with vessels and weapons of ever-changing characteristics� 
The staff of the college, generally fresh from the fleet and a course at the college, 
pre sents the accepted principles of war, and the accepted manner of writing orders, 
issues the rules of the war games to be played, and helps the pupils play them�34 
After their interactions with officers of higher rank, Knox and King frequently 
compared notes about their discussions of organizational and naval leadership� 
Reflecting on his personal experiences, King noted that “Captain Sims himself 
was an officer of extraordinary energy, but given to speaking with exaggeration”; 
he observed that, for Sims, “all matters were clear white or dead black�” Although 
King claimed to be less committed, Knox remained cheerfully associated with 
Sims throughout the First World War and beyond� As head of the Planning 
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Section in USN Headquarters in Europe, Knox frequently collaborated with 
King and Pye, both of whom served on the seagoing staff of Admiral Henry T� 
Mayo, the wartime commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet� Characterizing his 
mentors, King thought that “Sims was flighty, Osterhaus steady, and Mayo was 
the man for me�”35
Debates surrounding the practical functions of the Naval War College and 
the role of higher education raged in the seagoing wardrooms and officers clubs 
ashore, even as the U�S� Navy sailed over the horizon to participate in the first war 
requiring American forces to operate within a strategic context of multinational 
operations in foreign waters� Having assumed the presidency of the Naval War 
College in the rank of captain in February 1917, Sims within weeks became com-
mander of USN forces in Europe—largely by accident�36 By June, he was serving 
in the temporary wartime rank of vice admiral (three stars)� Yet Sims lacked a 
clear prerogative to assert control over the warships now participating in ongoing 
operations; instead they fell under the immediate command of his lineal senior 
in rank, Mayo of the Atlantic Fleet�37
Nonetheless, Mayo and Sims collaborated in developing American naval 
strategy by pioneering organizational means to harness the advantages of wireless 
Admiral Henry T. Mayo with Atlantic Fleet staff. Mayo’s chief of staff, Captain Ernest J. King, is at far left; his fleet intelligence officer, Commander William 
S. Pye, is third from left, on the steps behind Mayo.
U.S. Navy photograph
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communications and to enable naval 
headquarters ashore to orchestrate the 
interactions of operations and intel-
ligence. To their great credit, Mayo and 
Sims unified their collective strategic 
efforts, empowering their immediate 
subordinates to act with their authority 
in planning multinational strategy, mak-
ing recommendations governing USN 
tactical forces in European waters, and 
executing operational decisions. Relying 
on their previous associations with those 
who were now their subordinates, Mayo 
and Sims empowered them to overcome 
problems of command organization. 
From within the “London Flagship” 
headquarters, Sims authorized Knox 
to work with King and Pye in mobiliz-
ing the forces of Mayo and the Atlantic 
Fleet. However, while Mayo and Sims 
established a great rapport, subordinate 
Atlantic Fleet commanders such as Wilson and Rodman frequently challenged 
Sims’s authority, which just as frequently required Mayo to promulgate directives 
to enforce those of Sims.38
In dealings with foreign allies, the U.S. Navy suffered from intramural fighting 
among its various disjointed commands. The parochialism and patriarchalism 
within USN culture ultimately convinced Mayo to sign a memorandum concern-
ing the Atlantic Fleet staff that had been drafted by Captains King and Donald 
C. Bingham, with assistance from Commander Pye, under the title “Education 
and Training of Officers for Staff Duty.”39 On February 20, 1919, in one of his last 
acts as Atlantic Fleet commander, Mayo submitted the recommendations to the 
Bureau of Navigation in Washington.
“Officers assigned to ‘staff duty’ should,” Mayo argued, have the “same view-
point and perspective as that to which flag officers . . . have attained by reason of 
their study, training, and long experience throughout their careers in the service.” 
Mayo criticized the prevailing system of educating officers to master tactical 
doctrines and technical functions governing shipboard routines rather than 
subjects focused on higher strategic levels. He observed that the Navy suffered 
from the “present lack of arrangements for the education and training of officers 
for ‘staff duty.’” Mayo endorsed the Naval War College approach, arguing that the 
Vice Admiral William S. Sims, USN, as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe 
during World War I.
U.S. Navy photograph, courtesy Dr. Nathaniel Sims
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curriculum represented a prerequisite for 
practitioners to succeed at higher levels 
of command� He noted that the College’s 
curriculum was “generally reserved for 
the instruction of higher ranking offi-
cers”; as a result, the Naval War College 
lacked “facilities of sufficient general 
scope for the education and training of 
officers for ‘staff duty�’”40
Mayo returned from the First World 
War determined to address the funda-
mental problem of education within the 
U�S� Navy� In 1919, he accepted reduction 
from four- to two-star rank and a sun-
set advisory assignment to the General 
Board of the Navy� He also arranged or-
ders for his protégé King to assume com-
mand of the Naval Postgraduate School 
at the Naval Academy in Annapolis� 
After reporting for duty on May 1, King 
immediately lobbied the Navy Depart-
ment for an expanded budget and additional personnel for the school�41
EDUCATION BEFORE THE MAST
The special bond among American naval practitioners influenced the develop-
ment of professional identity within the Navy� Within the structured culture 
of the naval service, sailors all stood essentially equal in the unique context of 
shipboard life at sea� Skippers traditionally took responsibility for nurturing their 
subordinates so that eventually they would earn commands of their own�
Seagoing experience prevailed in establishing reputations for higher com-
mand within the ranks of the Navy� Mayo and Sims stood out as advocates for 
professional education among the salt-horse culture that persisted after the 
First World War among the members of the elder generation of practitioners� 
By contrast, their contemporaries in rank—particularly Benson, Rodman, and 
Wilson—resisted challenges to the status quo� “The opinion has been generally 
held in the Navy,” King noted, that the “only way to learn things is to do them,” 
whereas “[b]ook learning [and] abstract knowledge is like fertilizer,” he observed; 
it “does not of itself produce anything, but it stimulates growth and advance when 
the live seed [of] practical experience is instilled into the soil�”42
Admiral William S. Sims with Admiral Henry T. Mayo in 1918. 
U.S. Navy photograph
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   131 5/1/18   11:11 AM
11
Kohnen: Charting a New Course: The Knox-Pye-King Board and Naval Professi
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 1 3 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Wartime experiences inspired King to enter the fray in efforts to establish 
higher professional education standards in the U�S� Navy� He first broadened the 
Naval Postgraduate School curriculum, focusing on the mission of preparing 
student practitioners for assignment to receive graduate education at civilian 
universities� He fostered partnerships between the school and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Harvard, Columbia, Northwestern, the University of 
Chicago, and the state universities of Iowa, Wisconsin, and Michigan� King de-
veloped the curriculum to focus on transcendent concepts of permanent value 
rather than empirically framed staff school solutions� King assumed the function 
of teacher, rather than examiner, at the school� His approach contrasted with the 
traditional culture of military discipline that prevailed on “the Yard” at the Naval 
Academy� In the spring of 1919, King solicited assistance from his mentors Mayo 
and Sims�
While peace negotiations dragged on at Versailles, outside Paris, after the 
armistice, USN forces demobilized from wartime operations and returned to 
American waters� But in wartime propaganda Sims had attained heroic status as 
the personality most associated with victory in the First World War and inter-
national fame as the widely mythologized personification of the spirit of future 
Anglo-American collaboration� With Sims having been promoted from captain 
in 1917 to four-star admiral by 1919, it appeared politically inevitable that he 
would remain in four-star rank as Chief of Naval Operations�
However, after the American declaration of war Sims had performed his war-
time service in a temporary status, so technically he remained in his permanent 
assignment as President of the Naval War College� And over drinks with his 
friend Knox in Paris in January 1919 Sims learned about the Navy Department’s 
plans to proceed with the disestablishment of the separate Army and Navy War 
Colleges; Captain William V� Pratt had written to Knox earlier about the plans 
of Navy Secretary Daniels and Secretary of War Newton D� Baker to establish a 
consolidated war college in Washington, DC� With this most recent news, Sims 
requested immediate orders to return to the Naval War College� In the course 
of his reassignment, he accepted demotion from his temporary wartime rank of 
four stars to a permanent peacetime rank of two stars�43
Sims recruited his protégé Knox and his former intelligence officer in London, 
Lieutenant Tracy Barrett Kittredge, to join the faculty of the College� Sharing 
similar concerns about the future of professional education within the Navy, Sims 
and Knox developed a strategy to save the Naval War College� Sims also worked 
through the good offices of King at the Postgraduate School and Mayo on the 
General Board in Washington� Together, they drew from the model that Sir Julian 
Corbett had designed at the Admiralty in London, wherein historically trained 
analysts associated with the Historical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division 
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examined issues of contemporary importance to the 
RN staff. In June, Sims empowered Knox and Kittredge 
to organize at the Naval War College an analogous sub-
division known as the Historical Section. The section’s 
immediate charter was to synthesize analytical re-
quirements supporting the higher educational mission 
to align with those of the Operations Navy (OpNav) 
planning staff in Washington.
Rather than proffering overt challenges to the au-
thority of Daniels or the Navy Department, Mayo and 
Sims worked outside the General Board and the Naval 
War College—through their protégés. Mayo and Sims 
empowered these more junior officers to incite a bu-
reaucratic revolution from below. Mayo acted through 
King at the Postgraduate School in Annapolis to initi-
ate actions, which provided the pretext for Sims in his 
turn to initiate a study of the problem of education.44 
Knox, the Naval War College chief of staff, recom-
mended the establishment of a board to study the criti-
cal issues and offer recommendations for future action. 
King subsequently shared Knox’s recommendations with the superintendent of 
the Naval Academy, Rear Admiral Archibald H. Scales.45 In turn, Scales endorsed 
the idea of organizing a board to examine the issues, offer findings, and provide 
a strategy for professional education.46
This methodology granted Mayo and Sims bureaucratic immunity, as it was 
Knox and King who influenced Scales to endorse a recommendation to the 
Bureau of Navigation to establish a board consisting of Naval War College and 
Naval Postgraduate School personnel to study the strategic problem of profes-
sional education. Knox worked the ropes with other members of the Naval 
War College faculty while King and Pye gathered evidence to substantiate their 
arguments.
In particular, King drew inspiration from the works of Professor Edgar James 
Swift of Washington University in Saint Louis, Missouri. King would use Swift 
and his 1918 book, Psychology and the Day’s Work: A Study in the Application of 
Psychology to Daily Life, as tools in the longer battle for educational reform in 
the Navy. King invited Swift to lecture at the Postgraduate School and influenced 
Sims to sponsor Swift on a regular basis as a visiting lecturer at the Naval War 
College. Swift offered a critical argument that not “until facts have been accu-
mulated and ordered are suggestions that are worth while likely to appear.” He 
maintained that “[k]nowledge gives the raw material for solving problems, but in 
Lieutenant Tracy Barrett Kittredge, USNR.
Courtesy Branden Little
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addition to knowledge there must be a sensitive, open mind anxious to see things 
as they are, instead of as we should wish them to be�”47
Meanwhile, the bureaucratic wheels of the Navy Department churned blindly 
among the various bureaus� Since the establishment of the Navy Department in 
1794, whenever the seagoing forces navigated the uncharted waters in the nexus 
between peace and war, the department had followed a sustained administra-
tive course fueled by politics and mediocrity� Having muddled through the First 
World War, the Navy Department bureaucracy under Secretary Daniels settled 
back into its traditional peacetime routines�
Before the First World War, Daniels had used naval education as a means to 
amalgamate immigrants and the lower economic classes, encouraging them to 
embrace their identity as American citizens� As part of shaping the future in 
general, he considered the U�S� Navy an ideal platform to advance the broader 
military policy of the United States� “It is my ambition to make the Navy a great 
university,” Daniels reported, “with college extensions afloat and ashore�” He sug-
gested that every warship “should be a school � � � [and] every enlisted man and 
petty and warrant officer should receive the opportunity to improve his mind, 
better his position, and fit himself for promotion�”48
Although Daniels somewhat shared Sims’s vision about the role of education, 
their opinions on civil-military relations proved radically different� Daniels wor-
ried that Navy professionals might use education as a means to undermine tradi-
tional American civil-military ideals� He wanted the Navy to support education 
to create American citizens, rather than merely to satisfy the applied purposes 
of military or naval practitioners�49 Given these concerns, Daniels endorsed the 
recommendation by the chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Rear Admiral Thomas 
Washington, to organize a board comprising Knox, King, and Pye to examine the 
question�
Traveling between Newport and Annapolis during the summer of 1919, Knox, 
King, and Pye gathered their evidence� Knox later recalled the moment when 
their report came together at King’s hand, explaining that while Knox “was theo-
retically the senior member � � � and many ideas were contributed by Pye,”
the principal man was King� After much deliberation, King suggested that we write 
the report� King sat down at a desk and wrote that report in the course of perhaps a 
day� Scarcely any change [was] made from [the] preliminary draft� He wrote it and 
followed the details through in his logical way� The report came out of King’s head 
primarily� There was a great deal of ground work by Pye, but the stringing together 
and the argument that you make in such cases was all King’s� No one without out-
standing ability could have done what he did there�50
King attempted to frame the board’s findings in objective, empirical terms 
within a thirty-one-page treatise that bore the awkward title “Report and 
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Recommendations of a Board Appointed by the Bureau of Navigation Regarding 
the Instruction and Training of Line Officers�” The authors formally submitted 
their findings to the Bureau of Navigation on October 16, 1919�
The original, typewritten report circulated among the various bureaus of the 
Navy Department� While Admiral Washington acknowledged receipt of the re-
port with thanks to Knox, King, and Pye, he considered their recommendations 
impractical because they would have required the Navy Department to sustain 
a forty-year strategy for educating individual naval practitioners throughout 
their careers� He declared that inadequate bureaucratic and budgetary resources 
to maintain educational programs ashore, amplified by the shortage of officer 
personnel for service afloat, prevented the Bureau of Navigation from acting on 
the board’s recommendations� Washington effectively suppressed the report; the 
original vanished into the black hole of the Navy Department bureaucracy after 
its last reported sighting in April 1920�51
Undeterred by the report’s purported loss, Knox and King conspired to force 
the Navy Department to address the strategic problem of education within the 
service� Acting with the confidence of their convictions, Knox and King launched 
a bureaucratic revolution from below, within the ranks of the service� Six years 
Sims with Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Delano Roosevelt at the Navy Department in 1920.
U.S. Navy photograph
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earlier, on the advice of Sims and Knox, King had accepted the voluntary position 
of secretary-treasurer of the Naval Institute. In this role, he edited and reviewed 
articles in the institute’s professional journal Proceedings. Thus, King’s position 
Original signatures from K-P-K Report of 1919.
Library of Congress
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was one of significant influence� Following the disappearance of the board’s origi-
nal report to the Bureau of Navigation, King used a duplicate copy to arrange the 
report’s publication in the Proceedings issue of August 1920�52 King later admitted 
to “arranging” the publication of the report� In the published version, King added 
the caveat “Published by permission of the Navy Department for the information 
of the service� The Report of the Board has been approved, but the shortage of of-
ficers will not permit the recommendations to be carried into effect at present�”53
With some editorial adjustments, the published version in Proceedings re-
flected the original narrative of the typewritten original� Even though he was the 
report’s primary author, King claimed no immediate responsibility for its pub-
lication; the article appeared in Proceedings without any attribution to authors� 
Even so, the report would become widely known within the Navy as that of the 
Knox-Pye-King Board, or K-P-K Board�54
In the article, the supplemental recommendations to the Navy Department 
to take action on the question of education appeared in starkly framed prose� 
Between the lines of the article’s narrative, the K-P-K Board railed against the 
problems of bureaucracy, the dogmatic deference to doctrine among service 
practitioners, and the coercive intent and power of orthodoxy in the education 
of USN professionals�55 By its construction in two sections, the article makes the 
assertions in the original report resonate more sharply�56 Unlike the published 
Proceedings variation, the signed original reads like an indictment against the 
bureaucratic culture of the Navy�
Given the timing of the article and Sims’s close association with the authors of 
the K-P-K Board report, Secretary Daniels associated such criticisms with Sims� 
In effect, Sims was daring Daniels to ignore the findings and recommendations 
of the K-P-K Board—and the oily politician Daniels disliked the watery practi-
tioner Sims for challenging the policies of the Navy Department� The ensuing 
bureaucratic duels between Daniels and Sims became infamous, inspiring formal 
congressional inquiries and embarrassing the Navy Department—but remained 
a persistent influence on the development of the U�S� Navy�
The rivalry between Daniels and Sims must be considered when placing the 
K-P-K Board report into the broader context of historical discussions concern-
ing the still unresolved historical question of professional education and the U�S� 
Navy� Notwithstanding that, the findings of the K-P-K Board defined a progres-
sive vision of professional education� Publication of the report achieved the 
K-P-K Board’s design: it sparked heated debate within the tribal culture of the 
Navy about that progressive vision� Lines of division became clear as the debate 
on naval education stratified relations between policy makers such as Secretary 
Daniels and practitioners such as Admirals Mayo and Sims�
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Ultimately, the K-P-K Board offered a coldly honest portrayal of fellow naval 
professionals as being insufficiently prepared for the broad spectrum of chal-
lenges facing the naval profession. For those serving at the lowest levels to the 
highest levels of command, the K-P-K Board provided a lasting warning against 
allowing the U.S. Navy to sail under the command of officers who were “‘edu-
cated’ only to the lowest commissioned grade.” The solution to this fundamental 
problem actually preceded the original setting out of the question, as Mayo and 
Sims worked through Knox and King in a roundabout strategy to first acknowl-
edge the problem of ignorance before addressing the transcendent question of 
professional education within the Navy.
One emphasis in the report was a requirement for officers to attend the Naval 
War College twice in their careers. The authors of the report led that charge; 
for example, King completed the College’s correspondence course in 1924, then 
graduated from the residence course in 1933. Among others, the K-P-K Board 
directly influenced the Naval War College studies of future admirals Thomas 
Hart, Harold Stark, Harry Yarnell, Edward C. Kalbfus, and Chester W. Nimitz.
With King orchestrating Anglo-American combined strategy and simulta-
neously supervising U.S. naval operations on an unprecedented global scale after 
1941, Knox attained one-star rank as a commodore while organizing the Office 
of Naval History. In 1943, Knox and King again joined forces with the President 
of the Naval War College, Pye, to revisit the question of professional education 
in the U.S. Navy. Twenty-five years after the original K-P-K Report, Knox and 
King contributed to the recommendations found in the “Pye Board” Report of 
1944, which influenced combined and joint professional education into the Cold 
War era.57
Sims and the Naval War College class of 1923. Future Chiefs of Naval Operations Commander Chester W. Nimitz and Commander Harold R. Stark are at 
fourth row, center, no. 54, and third row, fourth from left, no. 36, respectively.
Naval War College photograph
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By attacking the problem of education openly and without deference to 
higher-ranking personalities or bureaucratic protocols, the K-P-K Board helped 
place the U�S� Navy on the course that would educate the personnel who would 
secure the strategic victories of the Second World War� Pursuant to the vision of 
ensuring an American “navy second to none,” the K-P-K Board report remains a 
critical foundation to establishing the fundamental role that higher professional 
education has played in framing the future strategy of the U�S� Navy into the 
twenty-first century and beyond�
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